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CHOICE OF LAW: INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT
OF DUTIES OF SUPPORT
DIVORCES and illegitimate births in increasing numbers have im-
posed a heavy financial burden on state welfare programs. Where
an obligor and obligeel are in the same state, courts have expe-
rienced little difficulty in shifting burdens of support to husbands
and fathers under a state-created statutory duty of support. How-
ever, where the obligor is either in a different state for the period
during which support is sought, or has fled from the obligee's state
subsequent to such period, the interstate enforcement of duties of
support has presented an acute problem 2 intensified by divergent
rules of support s and conflicting choice of law rules. This comment
will explore the impact of these choice of law rules upon the mea-
sure of relief afforded by recently adopted uniform reciprocal acts.
CHOICE OF LAW PRIOR TO THE UNIFORM ACTS: THE FORUM RULE
Yarborough v. Yarborough,4 decided in 1933, is the only case
wherein the Supreme Court has considered the choice of law ques-
tion involved in interstate enforcement of duties of support. In a
prior divorce proceeding, a Georgia court had relieved a father of
liability for continuing support of his minor child by requiring
him to make a single lump-sum payment. While subsequently
residing with her grandparents in South Carolina, the child sought
further support in a South Carolina court. The Supreme Court
denied relief, holding that the obligor's duty in an action for support
is to be determined by the law of the state where the obligor is
domiciled.5 Thus, even though the child may have been entitled
'The following general definitions will apply in this comment: an obligee is a
person to whom a duty of support is owed; an obligor is a person owing a duty of
support; the demanding state is that in which a proceeding pursuant to one of the
reciprocal laws is commenced, and is usually the state where the obligee is present;
the asylum state is that state responding to a proceeding in the demanding state, and
is usually the state where the obligor is found.
2See Brockelbank, The Problem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act Offers a
Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951).
SFor a comprehensive listing of the duties of support prescribed by the various
states, see 9C UNIF. LAws ANN. 10-12 (Supp. 1964).
' 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
' The opinion has been limited by the commentators as applying only to judgments
and as mere dictum lacking judicial precedent. CURIE. SELErED ESSAYS ON THE CON.
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to additional support under South Carolina law, Georgia law was
held to control in South Carolina courts and to preclude further
recovery.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, drafted in 1934, incor-
porated and extended the Yarborough rule by specifying that no
state could impose a statutory duty of support upon any person who
was neither domiciled within the state nor subject to the jurisdiction
of the state at the time suit was commenced.6 Furthermore, under
the Restatement no state could "directly enforce a duty of support
created by the law of another state."7  In essence, therefore, the
Restatement provided that a duty of support could be imposed only
by the lex fori of the state in which personal jurisdiction over the
obligor could be obtained by virtue of his domicile or physical
presence.
Under the forum rule an obligee who resides in a state without
personal jurisdiction of the obligor has three possible courses of
action. First, he may wait for the obligor to subject himself to the
jurisdiction of the obligee's state. Here the hope for recovery is
negligible.
Secondly, the obligee may pursue the obligor to any state in
which the latter is subject to the personal jurisdiction of local courts
and there sue to enforce the duty of support provided by the local
lex fori.8 Many state courts will assume jurisdiction of such actions,
regardless of the residence of the obligee,9 on the theory that they are
FLICr OF LAWS 737 (1963); STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 331 (3d ed.
1963); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Support Duties, 42 CAIJF. L. Rv. 382, 385
nn.25 9- 26 (1954). Nonetheless, a Texas court recently cited Yarborough in refusing to
enforce the law of California against an obligor who had moved to Texas after
incurring a statutory duty to support an indigent relative in California. California v.
Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 200, 309 S.W.2d 227. 230, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967 (1958), 37
TExAs L. REv. 773 (1959). See also Berkley v. Berkley, 246 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Mo. 1952).
0 "A state has legislative jurisdiction to impose upon one person a duty to support
another person if (a) the person to be supported is domiciled within the state and
the person to support is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, or (b) the person to
support is domiciled within the state although the person to be supported is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the state, or (c) both parties are subject to the jurisdiction
of the state, though neither is domiciled there." RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §
457 (1934).
7 Id. at § 458. This is based on the assumption that "whether the duty is criminal
or civil in character, its enforcement is of no special interest to other states and since
the duty is not imposed primarily for the benefit of an individual, it is not enforceable
elsewhere under principles of the Conflict of Laws." Id. at § 458, comment a.
'See, e.g., Commonwealth %, Acker, 197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312 (1908); Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 689 (1958).
o "The present tendenc% seems to be to emphasize the moral duty of the father to
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furthering a valid policy of preventing the state from becoming a
haven for deserting providers.10 Nevertheless, if the forum state
would not have imposed a duty of support under the particular
circumstances of the case, no duty will be recognized under the
forum rule even if the obligee and the obligor resided in another
state which recognized a duty for the period in which support is
requested." Moreover, even if a duty of support is recognized by
the forum state, the remedy may be unavailable because of the
prohibitive expense of pursuing the obligor,' or ineffective due to
the obligor's ability to flee the forum state, thereby starting the
entire process anew.12
If the duty to support in the obligee's state carries criminal
sanctions, a third alternative permits that state to extradite the
obligor as a fugitive from justice under the extradition provisions
of the federal constitution and statutes.13  Federal extradition pro-
visions, however, are applicable only to criminal acts of non-support
committed while the obligor was within the demanding state.' 4 If
the act of non-support was committed outside the demanding state,
support, with, as a consequence, an increasing tendency to permit the nonresident
mother and child to sue the local father under the local statute." STUMBERG, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at 333.
10 See, e.g., State v. Tetreault, 97 N.H. 260, 85 A.2d 386 (1952); Conwell v. Conwell,
3 N.J. 266, 273, 69 A.2d 712, 71_6 (1949); Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 540, 254 P.2d
528, 541 (1953) (Traynor, J., dissenting in part).
"Thus where a duty of support exists in the state from which the obligor has
fled, but is not recognized by the asylum state, the obligor will escape liability at the
hands of courts which, adhering to traditional territorial concepts, refuse to apply the
law of another jurisdiction in an action initiated in their state. See note 7 sup ra.
. 12 See Brockelbank, supra note 2, at 94. The cost to the taxpayers of supporting
destitute families of obligors who had evaded their duty by fleeing to another state
was estimated in 1950 at about $205,000,000 a year. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCE-
MENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 4 (1960); see 9C UNIF. LAWS ANN. 3-5 (1957); 45 IL. L. RaV.
252 (1950).
18 "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2, cI. 2.
The federal statute implementing this constitutional provision provides that when-
ever the executive authority of the state demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, and produces an authenticated copy of an indictment found against such
person, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the responding state to cause
such person to be arrested and delivered to the agent of the demanding state. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194, 3195 (1958).
4' Federal and state courts have interpreted the Constitution and subsequent
statutes as applicable only to persons who were physically present in the demanding
state at the time of the crime and then fled from that state. Hyatt v. People ex. rel.
Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903); State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
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the obligor is not a fugitive from that state and federal extradition
law will not apply. Moreover, extradition is generally an inade-
quate remedy because of its prohibitive expense and technical
requirements which often cannot be satisfied.15
Under the traditional forum rule, therefore, it is relatively diffi-
cult for an obligee to enforce duties of support. The obligor could
evade liability by fleeing to a state which does not impose a duty of
support, or select a state without criminal sanctions and flee that
jurisdiction when pursued by the obligee.
RECIPROCAL SUPPORT ACTS
Since deserted obligees frequently become charges of the state in
which they reside,16 it was recognized that the traditional choice of
law rule would not effectively shift the burden of providing support
to the rightful obligors. In order to minimize expense and other-
wise facilitate the interstate enforcement of duties of support, all
states have adopted support acts which provide for reciprocal civil
enforcement procedures. An obligee entitled to support under the
reciprocal act of the demanding state17 is permitted to file a petition
in a local court which is forwarded by mail to the asylum state.'8
After granting the obligor a hearing, the asylum state applies the
duty of support determined to be applicable under a choice of law
rule 9 in the asylum state's reciprocal act, collects any amount due,
and remits the funds to the obligee.20 Most acts also contain crim-
'I Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 1028, 98 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1950) (dictum).
16 See note 12 supra.
17 See definitions note 1 supra. In essence, the courts of both the demanding and
asylum states must find a duty of support under the appropriate choice of law as
designated by their own reciprocal act. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT, §§ 13, 20, 9C UNIF. LAWS ANN. 41, 56 (1957). Cobbe v. Cobbe, 163 A.2d 333 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1960); In re Duncan, 172 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); cf. Ross v. Ross,
206 Misc. 1073, 136 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Child. Ct. 1954).
28 See definitions note 1 supra.
19 The purpose of these statutes was twofold: first, to combat the apathy expressed
in the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 457 (1934) of the states having no interest in
enforcing the support duties of other states. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, HAND-
BOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 171,
172 (1950). The second purpose was to provide a relatively low cost and effective
method of obtaining assistance from the deserting husband. See Commissioners'
Prefatory Note, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 291-92 (1952).
20 The asylum state, of course, must obtain jurisdiction of the obligor. rhis proce-
dure or a similar form thereof is found in both the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA) and the Uniform Support of Dependents Act (USDA). 90
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inal extradition provisions.21 Enforcement of these acts is based
merely upon a common interest in uniformity and cooperation;
consequently, conflict between state policies may result in a court
refusing to apply a reciprocal act.22
Civil Liability Under the Uniform Support
of Dependents Act (USDA)
The USDA, in force only in New York,23 contains a choice of
law provision precluding the state from enforcing another jurisdic-
tion's duty of support unless, under the circumstances, a similar duty
exists in the asylum state as well. 24 In essence, the USDA is merely
a reiteration of the traditional forum rule: it provides no remedy
where the asylum state (the forum state) would itself impose no
duty of support.
UNIF. LAws ANN. §§ 7-28 (1957, Supp. 1964) (URESA); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 34, 37
(Supp. 1964) (USDA); Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43
MINN. L. Rv. 875 (1959). Reciprocity between the USDA and URESA is discussed in
Landes v. Landes, I N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1956).
21 See, e.g., 19 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1660; 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:30-35 (1951); 9
TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 2328 (b)-2 (1963). The criminal enforcement procedure normally
provides for extradition upon the demand of the executive authority of the demanding
state. It applies no matter whether the obligor was in the demanding state, the
asylum state, or a third state at the time he committed the crime. See Annot., 81
A.L.R. 552, 580 (1932). This procedure was included in the URESA because it was a
traditional method of solving the problem, and because the drafters were not certain
that the civil procedure would apply in all cases. BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note
12, at 15. Professor Brockelbank was the Chairman of the Committee which drafted
the 1950 URESA and the 1952 URESA.
The USDA does not contain a criminal enforcement procedure.
22 E.g., Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1950);
California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967 (1958).
Enforcement may also be frustrated by judicial refusal to apply the laws of a state
outside that state's territorial jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 35, 50.51
infra. In certain cases, however, the territorial concept may serve merely as an excuse
for dismissing a case because of conflicting local policy. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't
of Pub. Assistance v. Mong, 160 Ohio St. 455, 117 N.E.2d 32 (1954), 29 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
1480, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 938, 939. Both casenotes were critical of the Mong decision.
"sN.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §§ 30-43 (Supp. 1964); see Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768, 773-75
(1955).
24 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 35 (2)- (4) (Supp. 1964). Since the obligee must be
entitled to recovery under the law of the demanding state, see note 17 supra and
accompanying text, under the USDA the support law of both the demanding and
asylum states must be identical. Cf. Ross v. Ross, 206 Misc. 1073, 136 N.Y.S.2d 23
(Child. Ct. 1954).
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Civil Liability Under the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA): The
Election Rule versus the Presence Rule
The civil enforcement provisions of the original URESA2 5 enable
the obligee to elect either the law of the state where the alleged
obligor was present during the period for which support is sought,
or the law of the state where the obligee was present when the failure
to support commenced. 26  Although the latter alternative may have
been adopted to provide a solution only when the whereabouts of
the obligor were unknown,27 literal construction of the original
URESA in effect created a new choice of law rule under which the
obligee could demand application of the law of his own state in a
civil action initiated in the courts of the obligor's state.28 The
election rule thus enables courts of the asylum state to apply the
obligee's state law in the absence of an overriding local public
policy.29 Relatively few jurisdictions have retained the election rule
of the original URESA.30
The Commission on Uniform State Laws eliminated the election
rule of the original URESA in 195231 and provided for determina-
tion of the existence and extent of a duty of support by the law of
2r The purposes of the act are explained in Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1950
Act, 9C UNIF. LAWS ANN. 3-5 (1957).
26 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1670; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2328b-3 (1964).
The purpose of this section was to guard against the attitude expressed in the RFSTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 258, comment a (1934) that the enforcement of a duty of
support is of no special interest to other states and that the duty is not imposed for
the benefit of the individual but for the state. This theory, however, appears to have
been losing favor even without the URESA. BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26;
see State v. Echavarria, 101 N.H. 458, 146 A.2d 256 (1958).
2T See Commissioners' Note to § 7 of the URESA, 9C UNiF. LAws ANN. 27 (1957);
see Brockelbank, Is The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act Constitu-
tional?, 31 Oa. L. REv. 97, 99-102 (1952). But see Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 382.
But despite any intended limitations, the election rule on its face accorded com-
plete discretion to the obligee. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
28 Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 388-89.
"Although § 7 of the URESA was originally criticized as an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial power, courts have generally ignored the criticism. Comment,
45 ILL. L. REV. 252 (1950); see, e.g., Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
0 Every state except New York has adopted the URESA in one form or another.
9C UNiF. LAws ANN. 1-2 (1957, Supp. 1964). A minority of jurisdictions have
retained the election provision. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1670; Miss. CODE ANN. §
456-07 (1956); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2328b-3 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4782(7)
(1961). One state has an election provision, but it gives the election to the court of
that state rather than the obligee. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.48 (4) (Supp. 1964).
"I The author of the presence test argued that the amendment was necessary to
conform to the territorial concept that statutory laws of one state cannot control
conduct outside that state's boundaries. Stimson, Simplifying the Conflict of Laws; A
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the state where the obligor was present during the period for which
support is sought.32  Thus, according to the plain meaning of the
presence rule, if an obligor flees from the obligee's state A in 1962 to
state B, and from state B in 1964 to state C, assuming that state C
had adopted the amended URESA, a suit by the obligee in state C
to recover support for the years 1960-1965 would appear to result in
the application of three distinct bodies of law: state A's law would
control for the period from 1960-1962, B's law for the period from
1962-1964, and C's law for 1964-1965. 8 The Commissioners comple-
mented this presence test by incorporating a rebuttable presumption
that the obligor was present in the forum state during the period for
which support is sought. 4
Nevertheless, the purpose of the amendment was to limit the
applicable law to that of the forum; in drafting this amended pro-
vision the Commissioners were strongly influenced by the traditional
territorial concept that the statutory laws of one state cannot govern
conduct outside that state's territorial boundaries. 5 Thus, if courts
faced with the presence rule decide to effectuate the intent of the
Commissioners, they would be precluded from applying any law but
that of the forum and if the presumption of presence is rebutted by
Bill Proposed for Enactment by Congress, 36 A.B.A.J. 1003, 1004-05 (1950). But see
Ehrenzweig, supra note 5, at 383-90; 37 TEXAS L. REV. 772 (1959). Stimson's recom-
mendations were the basis for the amendment to § 7 of the URESA. Commissioners'
Note to § 7 of the URESA, 9C UNiF. LAws ANN. 27 (1957).
82 "Duties of support applicable under this law are those imposed or imposable
under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which
support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding
state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown." UNI-
FORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT Acr § 7, 9C UNIF. LAws ANN. 26 (1957).
The URESA was again amended in 1958, 90 UNIT. LAws ANN. 37-53 (Supp. 1964),
but this revision retained the 1952 presence test. 90 UNiF. LAWS ANN. 42 (Supp. 1964).
8
,"One of the most extensively discussed questions was that of the applicable duty
of support .... Professor Brockelbank explained that the [1952] Uniform Act contem.
plates presense of the obligor as the controlling factor. In other words, if the obligor
is present in the asylum state and a prospective support order is sought, then the
support duties set forth in the asylum state shall control. On the other hand if the
obligor was present in the demanding state in the past, and an order for arrearages
is sought, then the demanding state's support requirements would control." State of
New York Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation, Summary of Con-
ference on Social Welfare and Non-Support 3, item 71 (July 1953).
3, See note 32 supra. The Commissioners rejected any requirement that the law
of the obligor's domicile must govern, since the fact of domicile depends on the inten-
tion of the obligor to remain within the state for an indefinite period of time as well
as actual phygical presence. Simplicity and ease of application were thought to be
promoted by substituting the presumption for the necessity of proof of the obligor's
domicile by the obligee. See generally BROCKELBANK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26-28.
"5 See note 31 supra.
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the obligor, even the law of the forum could not impose a duty of
support for that period during which the obligor was not actually
subject to the jurisdiction of the asylum state. The only notable ad-
vantage over the forum rule of the choice of law rule contained in
the presence test, therefore, is a shifting of the burden of proving
personal jurisdiction of the forum state for the period in which
support was sought from the obligee to the obligor.3 6
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA)
If an obligee is precluded from recovery under the civil pro-
cedure in the asylum state due to the controlling choice of law rule,
he may nevertheless seek to extradite the obligor to a demanding
state if the duty of support in the latter state carries criminal sanc-
tions. The URESA contains a criminal extradition provision which
is substantially similar to section 6 of the UCEA.37 Section 6 of the
UCEA permits the asylum state to surrender to the demanding state
an obligor charged with intentionally committing an act in any state
which results in a crime in the demanding state.38 This provision is
more extensive than the federal extradition procedures30 in that the
obligor is not required to have committed the act of non-support
in the demanding state.40 Unlike the federal provisions, however,
86 Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 608-09, 123 A.2d 8, 8 (1956).
" Section 5 of the URESA is merely a specific application to non-support of the
more general provision in § 6 of the UCEA. Brockelbank, supra note 27, at 106.
Tradition and lack of certainty that the civil enforcement procedures would cover
all cases motivated inclusion of this method of enforcement. Moreover, it was felt
that the threat of extradition would tend to deter desertion by the obligor. BROCKEL-
BANK, op. cit. supra note 12, at 15. Colorado, Connecticut and the District of Columbia
have omitted the criminal enforcement section of the act. The Uniform Support of
Dependents Act of New York also omitted this section. Id. at 15 n.21.
86 "INmTasTrAT RENDITION-The Governor of this state (1) may demand from the
Governor of any other state the surrender of any person found in such other state
who is charged in this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of
any person in this state and (2) may surrender on denland by the Governor of any
other state any person found in this state who is charged in such other state with the
crime of failing to provide for the support of a person in such other state. The
provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply to any
such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not in the
demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and although he had
not fled therefrom. Neither the demand, the oath nor any proceedings for extradi-
tion pursuant to this section need state or show that the person whose surrender is
demanded has fled from justice, or at the time of the commission of the crime was in
the demanding of other state." UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT Acr
§ 5, 9C UNIF. LAws ANN. 23 (1957) See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768 (1955).
18 See notes 13 & 14 supra and accompan% ing text.
10 This extension of the power to extradite was in recognition of the inadequacy of
federal extradition law which required that the obligor have fled from justice and
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section 6 of the UCEA is not a constitutional mandate, but merely
an exercise of the asylum state's retained powers to enact reciprocal
laws. Consequently, its enforcement rests within the judicial dis-
cretion of the asylum state.4 1
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECIPROCAL ACTS
A recent New Hampshire decision illustrates the difficulties with
which obligees are still confronted despite the purported aid of
reciprocal statutes. In Hardy v. Betz,42 a New Hampshire resident
allegedly fathered a child in New Hampshire which was subse-
quently born in Massachusetts. After the child obtained welfare
benefits from the state, Massachusetts sought support from the puta-
tive father in a civil action. While Massachusetts retained the elec-
tion provision of the original URESA, 43 New Hampshire had
adopted the presence test of the amended act 4 ' requiring the appli-
cation of New Hampshire law. Since New Hampshire's statute of
limitations for determination of paternity had expired,45 no civil
duty of support was recognized.
The failure to support an illegitimate child, however, is a mis-
demeanor under Massachusetts law;46 thus Massachusetts subse-
quently attempted to extradite the putative father under section 6
of the UCEA, effective in both the demanding and asylum states. 47
In a decision which contravenes the only precedent squarely on
point48 and the express purpose of section 6,49 New Hampshire
fled from the state seeking extradition. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1950 Act,
9C UNIF. LAWS ANN. 4 (1957). Thus it recognized the need for redprocity to prevent
offending parties escaping duties of support. See Comment, 31 MINN. L. REV. 699
(1947).
"See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
12 105 N.H. 169, 195 A.2d 582 (1963).
"s MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 273A, § 4 (1956).
"1 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546:7 (Supp. 1964).
"5N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168:1 (Supp. 1964) provides a one year limitation on
paternity actions.
,6 MAsS. GEN. LAws ch. 273 § 15 (1956).
"7 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, §§ 11-20R (1956); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 612:1-30
(1955).
" The Ohio Supreme Court considered a similar fact situation in 1959 and
allowed extradition upon determining that the failure to provide support was the
commission of an act as required by the UCEA. In re Harris, 170 Ohio St. 151, 163
N.E.2d 762 (1959). The only possible distinction between Harris and Hardy v. Betz
is that Ohio had no law limiting the time a putative father could be sued for support.
"See In re Cooper. 53 Cal. 2d 772, 776, 349 P.2d 956, 958, 3 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 294 (1960); note 40 supra. For cases in which the UCEA has
been liberally applied, see In re Cooper, supra; State ex rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 191 Md.
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denied extradition on the ground that Massachusetts could not con-
stitutionally pass legislation attaching criminal sanctions to conduct
outside its own territorial limits.5 0
This territorial conceptr' constitutes the greatest obstacle to
interstate enforcement of duties of support. Application of this
concept in Hardy v. Betz vitiated section 6 of the UCEA and effec-
tively limited extradition powers to those granted by federal au-
thority. The forum rule of Yarborough, the Restatement, the
USDA, and the presence test of the amended URESA are infested
with territorialism. 1a Under all of these rules only the law of the
forum can be applied. Nevertheless, the status of the territorial
concept as a purported constitutional limitation on choice of law
has been questioned with increasing vigor by commentators52 and
courts alike.53 For instance, the Supreme Court has applied the
antitrust laws to conduct of citizens outside the territorial limits of
the United States.5 4 As early as 1941, the Court upheld the applica-
tion of substantive state criminal law to conduct occurring outside
its territorial limits.5 5 No court has yet held that the election rule
of the URESA violates the federal constitution.56 In several cases,
California courts have recognized the need to enforce the demanding
state's law where California, the asylum state, has no policy in con-
568, 62 A.2d 568 (1948); People ex rel. Faulds v. Herberich, 93 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div.
1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 614, 93 N.E.2d 913 (1950). See generally Annot., 151 A.L.R. 239
(1944).
50 195 A.2d at 584-85 (105 N.H. 169). In July 1964 the Reporter for the Restatement
suggested that the section upon which the New Hampshire court relied was "of little
significance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws 105-06 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964). Thus, it is arguable that New Hampshire was invoking a territorial concept
with regard to a criminal statute to prevent frustration of local policy. See note 22
supra.
51 See BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAXvs 52 (1935); STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL
LAws 3-7 (1936); cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57
(1909).
"a See generally CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 1-76 (1963).52 See CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 13, 14 (1942);
CumE, op. cit. supra note 51a, at 655-59; Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Terri-
torial Principle, 30 Mon. L. REv 238 (1931).
5' See cases cited notes 54, 55, 57, 58 infra.
11 Compare American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1909)
(adhering to the territorial concept), with Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-06 (1962) (applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to
conduct outside the United States territorial limits) and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co..
344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952).
0 5 Skiriotes %. Florida. 313 U.S. 69 t1941). 15 So. CAL. L. REV 93.
But cf. Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Assistance % Mong, 160 Ohio St. 455,
117 N.E.2d 32 (1954).
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flict with such enforcement. 57 Nevertheless, the rationale of Hardy
v. Betz permits an obligor to escape civil and criminal liability for
support merely by fleeing to a state which would not impose a duty.
By perpetuating the territorial concept, both the forum and presence
rules tend to defeat the interests of the demanding state without
permitting a determination of whether those of the asylum state are
thereby advanced. 58
Moreover, it is questionable whether the election rule of the
original URESA is a desirable substitute. Although the application
of this rule vitiates the territorial concept by requiring the forum
state to apply another state's law if such is elected, the inflexibility of
the rule renders it undesirable.59 The election rule simply accords
the obligee, rather than the obligor, an opportunity to forum-shop. 6°
If the state where the obligee is present does not recognize a duty of
17 Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal. 2d 389, 317 P.2d 987 (1957); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 46 Cal.
2d 313, 294 P.2d 1 (1956); Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
11 As such, the territorial concept is justifiable primarily on the ground that it
relieves the courts of the problem of determining the applicable law. In recognition
of the hardship imposed by such a strict rule, many criminal statutes in the United
States have departed from the territorial principal. See Berge, supra note 52. Some
courts have disregarded the principle in criminal cases without the aid of statute.
Compare People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953), with People v. Burt,
45 Cal. 2d 311, 288 P.2d 503, 51 A.L.R.2d 948 (1955), 7 HASINGS L.J. 206 (1956), 29
So. CAL. L. R y. 363 (1956). For a succinct discussion of these cases and a possible
limitation on the courts disregarding the territorial concept, see CuRttE, op. cit. supra
note 51a, at 655-59. If a person violates a valid state law by conduct outside its
boundaries and that state, having a valid reason for enforcing its law, gains jurisdiction
over the offender, there appears to be no barrier to enforcement of that law. CooK,
op. cit. supra note 52, at 14. See also 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 8 (English courts to hear
cases of felonious acts occurring outside England and resulting in death in England).
Various constitutional arguments have been unsuccessfully raised against the
uniform acts. Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d 613 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (due process); Landes v. Landes, I N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14
(1956); Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953) (equal protection). It seems that
in a support situation the state of the obligee would have enough incidents occurring
within its borders to give it legislative jurisdiction. See Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F.2d
326 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Starr v. Starr, 263 P.2d 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State ex Tel.
Sherwood v. Sherwood, 13 Ohio App. 403 (1921); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §
457 (1934).
"' Before the rule will be applied, however, it should be subject to the universal
limitation that no cause of action will be enforced which is contrary to public policy
of the forum. See cases cited note 22 supra; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918); cf. George v. George, 20 NJ. Misc. 41, 23 A.2d 599 (1942).
e0 Special Committee on Review of Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, First Tentative Draft,
p. 2 (mimeo), Sept. 8, 1952. In rejecting the election rule for the presence test of the
amended URESA, the Commissioners stated: "It was never intended [by the election
rule] that [the obligee].. . should have an absolute right to choose the applicable law
as her interest might dictate." Commissioners' Note, 9C UNIF. LAws ANN. 27 (1957).
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support, he may establish actual residence in a state according liberal
duties of support and then request application of that state's laws.
On the other hand, if the state where the obligee is present recognizes
a duty of support, he may bring an action there and elect that the
law of that state apply in the asylum state.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Although the uniform acts have facilitated interstate enforce-
ment of support duties in certain cases, their effectiveness is dimin-
ished by the varied choice of law provisions0 1 and by frequent judi-
cial refusal to apply the acts when to do so would conflict with a
policy of the forum state. 2 Each of these inhibitions is in some
measure traceable to the territorial concept. Upon recognition
that the territorial concept has little if any basis in modern law, 3
the states should take steps to stabilize the interstate enforcement of
support duties. One alternative to that end is adoption of the
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act64 by all states. Thereby,
substantive duties of support would be synchronized and the choice
of law problem obviated altogether. However, since present support
laws reflect divergent state policies, it is unrealistic to expect sub-
stantive uniformity. 65 The more practical solution would entail
departure from the present choice of law rules in favor of a new
theory of enforcement. Q6
In an interstate situation, the demanding state is interested in
the welfare of the obligee and in preventing unnecessary depletion
of its welfare funds, while the asylum state is interested in applying
its own laws of support for the protection of its citizens. In cases in
which these two interests clash, the court, rather than the obligee,
should be given the discretionary power to determine the law which
01 See Manis v. Genest, 210 Ga. 16, 77 S.E.2d 525 (1953) (required proof of
reciprocity); State ex rel. Lyon v. Lyon, 75 Nev. 495, 346 P.2d 709 (1959); EHRENZWEIG,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 406; Note, 18 STAN. L. REv. 901, 907-11 (1961).
02 See cases cited note 22 supra.
63 See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
0 9 UNIF. LAws ANN. 217-22 (1957).
Or The original draft of the URESA contained uniform duties of support, but the
representatives from the states rejected the proposals. They sought only interstate
enforcement of support duties as they exist in various state legislation. BROCKELBANK,
op, cit. supra note 12, at 32 n.60.
0 See CURRIE, op. cit. supra note 51a. at 177-87, 727-42; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws
54-58 (2d ed. 1951); Summer, The Status of Public Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A.L.
Rxv. 1, 12 (1955).
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should govern. 7 Under the governmental interest analysis approach
of one commentator, however, the courts' discretionary power in
choice of law situations would be significantly limited since weighing
competing state policies is not a proper judicial function.68 Under
this view, a court of the asylum state would be restricted to deter-
mining whether its own state has a legitimate interest in the appli-
cation of its laws.09 In the absence of a compelling local policy, the
law of the demanding state should apply. An approach such as this
would provide some measure of reciprocity and uniformity where
mechanical choice of law rules have failed.
g. 1. s., jr.
07 One state appears to have effected this change in the election rule. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.48 (Supp. 1964) provides: "The district court shall, at its discretion, enforce
the duties of support owed under the law of (1) the state where the obligee resided
when the obliger failed to support the obligee, or (2) this state...." (Emphasis
added.)
08 See CuRRLE, op. cit. supra note 51a, at 182-83.
69 See Cutau, op. cit. supra note 51a, at 177-87.
